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CURRENT DECISIONS
BANKRuPTcY-CoMPoSITIONS-ORIGINAL INDEBTEDNESS NOT REVIvED BY Nox-
PAYMENT OF COMPOSITION NoTEs.-Under a composition confirmed by the bank-
ruptcy court the creditors accepted a settlement of thirty per cent. partly in the
debtor's promissory notes. In a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, the notes
being unpaid, a creditor sought to prove a claim based on the original indebted-
ness, contending that it was revived by non-payment of the composition notes.
Held, that the original indebtedness was not revived. Matter of Mirkus (1923,
C. C. A. 2d) 289 Fed. 732.
This is the first decision on the point by a Circuit Court of Appeals. An
opposite result was reached under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. In re Hurst
(1876, C. C. E. D. Mich.) Fed. Cas. No. 6925. Dicta expressing a view contrary
to the principal case are to be found under the present Act. See Re Kinnane Co.
(915, S. D. Ohio) 221 Fed. 762; Loveland, Bankruptcy (4th ed. 1912) 1281.
The decision in the principal case is based on the similarity in the provisions, under
the present act, concerning a confirmed composition, and a discharge in bank-
ruptcy. The court correctly prefers an interpretation which excludes the old
creditors from sharing with the new ones assets acquired since the composition,
except to the extent of unpaid composition obligations. Jacobs v. Fensterstock
(1923, N. Y.) 69 N. Y. L. JOUR. 595. Even at common law, non-payment of notes
given under a composition agreement did not revive the original indebtedness if
the creditors had agreed to accept the notes themselves as full satisfaction. See
Evans v. Powis (1847) I Exch. 6oi; 3 Williston, Contracts (1920) 3168.
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-DETERMINATION OF UNCER-
TAIN JuRAL RELATIONs.-The plaintiff sublet to one Hawley a contract to paint
a building for the defendant Hospital and the defendant Casualty Company was
surety for faithful performance. Hawley partially performed and then aban-
doned his agreement. The plaintiff completed the contract but part of the con-
tract price was withheld by the Hospital because two mechanics' liens were filed
upon the building. The plaintiff asked for a declaratory judgment to determine
the jural relations of the parties, and for consequential relief after the validity
of the liens was determined. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief
asked. Joy v. Amsterdam Casualty et al. (1923) 98 Conn. 794.
The constitutionality of the declaratory judgment seems to be definitely estab-
lished notwithstanding the temporary doubt cast upon it by the since discredited
opinion in the case of Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. (192o) 211 Mich. 592, 179
N. W. 350. See COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 419; Braman v. Bab-
cock (1923) 98 Conn. 549, 120 Atl. i50; Blakeslee v. Wilson (923, Calif.) 213
Pac. 495. Where the legal relations of the parties in interest are uncertain, and,
the parties being before the court, a useful purpose is served by relieving the
uncertainty, the court will render a declaratory judgment. See COMMENTS (1920)
29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 545; Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed
Procedural Reform (1918) 28 ibid. I, 105; Sunderland, The Declaratory Judg-
ment (1917) 16 MIcH. L. REV. 69.
CONSTITUTIONAL -LAw-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-GRAIN FUTURES Acr.-The
plaintiffs sought to enjoin as unconstitutional the enforcement of the Act of Sept.
21, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 998) which forbade the use of interstate communication
in making sales of grain for future delivery. Held, that the bill was properly
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dismissed. Boa,-d of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen (1923) 262 U. S. I, 43 Sup.
Ct. 470.
In holding that the flow of grain through Chicago is interstate commerce not-
withstanding a local change of title, the Supreme Court has carried out a practi-
cal conception of commerce as a current or movement of commodities across
state lines. The court properly held that a manipulation of the market has a
direct relation to this movement. Swift & Co. v. United States (9o5) 196
U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276; Stafford v. Wallace (1922) 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct.
397; cf. Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co. (1922) 258 U. S. 50, 42 Sup. Ct. 244.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS-LEGISLATIVE POWER To DETER-
MINE EXTENT OF DRAINAGE DISTRac.-The legislature established a drainage
district including the plaintiff's land and assessed lands within the district for the
benefit of the Bronx Valley Sewer. N. Y. Laws, 1917, ch. 646. No benefit
could accrue to the plaintiff without" the construction of a connecting sewer.
Held, that the assessment was valid. The Valley Farms Co. v. County of West-
chester (923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 261.
The federal limitation on the power of the state legislatures to make or lay
the conditions of special assessments prohibits only purely arbitrary action.
Houck v. Little River Drainage District (1915) 239 U. S. 54, 36 Sup. Ct. 58;
Miller & Lux v. Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage District (1921) 256 U. S.
129, 41 Sup. Ct. 404. For a discussion of the constitutionality of special assess-
ments in general, see Page and Jones, Taxation by Assessment (I909) ch. V;
(igi6) 14 MICH. L. REV. 419.
CONTRAcTs-ExPREss CONDITIONS PRECEDENT-PERFORMANCE RENDERED IMPOS-
SIBLE BY OTHER PARTY.-The defendant contracted to supply the plaintiff with
automobiles for resale, and to pay an additional discount provided the contract
remained in force a full year and provided also that the plaintiff took his full
allotment. Either party could cancel the contract on five days' notice. Before
the expiration of the year, but after the plaintiff had taken his allotment, the
defendant cancelled the contract. The plaintiff sued to recover the additional
discount. Held, that he could not recover. Superior Motor Co. v. Chevrolet
Motor Co. (1923, Kan.) 212 Pac. ioo.
Although the obvious purpose of the conditions was accomplished the court
nevertheless insists upon a strict performance of all express conditions precedent.
See 2 Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 668; cf. Kelso and Co. v. Ellis (1918) 224
N. Y. 528, 121 N. E. 364. The plaintiff cannot set up impossibility of perform-
ance caused by the defendant's exercise of his power of cancellation. See Wil-
liston, op. cit. supra, sec. 677; Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contracts (1919)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 739; Ashley, Conditions in Contract (19o5) 14 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 424; Corbin, Supervening Impossibility of Performing Conditions
Precedent (1922) 22 CoL L. REv. 421.
CONTRAcTS-THImD PARTY BENEFICIARIES-DONEE-BENEFIcIARY ALLOWED TO
AcQUIRE IMMUNITY FROM SuiT.-One Bagdan assigned a promissory note made
by the defendant to the plaintiff with the express condition that he not demand
payment within one year. The defendant refused to pay on demand within the
year and the plaintiff sued on the note. The defendant set up the agreement
for the extension of time. The plaintiff's demurrer to this defense on the ground
that the defendant was not a party to the agreement was sustained and the defen-
dant appealed. Held, that the demurrer should be overruled. Baurer v. Devenes
(1923, Conn.) 121 Ati. 566.
The decision of the instant case definitely places Connecticut among the great
majority of states adopting the better view that donee-beneficiaries may sue on
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- a contract. See Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (I918) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, io68; Whittier, Contract Beneficiaries (1923) 32 YALE LAW
JoURNAI, 790. It is doubtful if Connecticut has ever denied such a power to a
donee-beneficiary. See Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons in
Connecticut (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 489. The instant case, however, is
not one of conferring on a creditor a power to sue, but of conferring on a debtor
an immunity from suit within the stipulated time.
FEDERAL PRAcrcE-INJuNcTIoN BASED UPON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-
NUMBER OF JUDGES REQuIRED.-The plaintiffs, corporations furnishing natural gas
to cpnsumers, alleging that the rates established by the orders of the Corporation
Commission were confiscatory, asked for injunctions on the ground that the orders
were unconstitutional. Held, that although the constitutionality of the orders
and not of a statute was involved, the cases were within section 266 of the Judicial
Code requiring a hearing by three judges. Oklahoma Gas Co. U. Russell (1923,
U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct 353.
The United States Supreme Court expressly construed section 266 of the
Judicial Code as it had before assumed it to be, stating that the amendment was
introduced to prevent any question that suh orders were within the section. Act
of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat. at L. IO87, 1162) as amended by Act of March 4, 1913
(37 Stat at L. 1O3) ; Cumberland Tel. and Tel. Co. v. La. Commission (1922,
U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 75; (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 621; contra: Michigan
Telephone Co. v. Odell (1922, E. D. Mich.) 283 Fed. 139.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-CRIMINAL CONVRSATioN-AcrION By WnF.-The plain-
tiff brought an action against the defendant for having had criminal intercourse
with her husband, without the plaintiff's privity, connivance or consent. The
trial court submitted the case to the jury. Held, that a judgment on the verdict
for the plaintiff should be sustained. Oppenheiin v. Kridel (1923) 236 N. Y. 156.
Actions of criminal conversation brought by a wife are commonly joined with
an action for alienation of affections. Seaver v. Adams (I89O) 66 N. H. 142,
I9 Atl. 7y6; Dodge v. Rush (i9o6) 28 App. D. C. I49; Nolin v. Pearson (igo6)
191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 89o. However, even where the action is for criminal
conversation alone, the courts, as in the above cases, are today inclined to give
the wife a cause of action. Watkins v. Lord (1918) 31 Idaho, 352, 171 Pac. 1133;
Turner v. Heavrin (I918) 182 Ky. 65, 2o6 S. W. 23; Frederick v. Morse (1914)
88 Vt I26, 92 Atl. I6. See Valentine v. Pollak (1920) 95 Conn. 556, III Ati. 869;
Smith v. Lyon (1918) 9 Ohio App. 141, 143; contra: Kroessin v. Keller (1895)
6o Minn. 372, 62 N. W. 438.
INjUNcTIoN-TREsPAss TO LAND--INJuRY TO CRoPS.-The plaintiff asked for
an injunction to enjoin the defendant from going on his land and taking posses-
sion of and harvesting his wheat crop. Held, that although the insolvency of
the defendant was not shown an injunction should be granted. Nazarenus v.
Wigle (923, Colo.) 212 Pac. 826.
In a few cases the courts have said that a violation of the right which a person
has in the exclusive dominion over his soil is such an injury as will justify equit-
able relief. Cf. Lamprey v. Danz (I9o2) 86 Minn. 317, 90 N. W. 578; Oliphant
v. Richmond (i9o4) 67 N. J. Eq. 280, 59 Atl. 241; NoTES (1915) 15 COL. L. Rv.
537. This seems an extreme application of the rule that equity will act only to
prevent irreparable injury. In the instant case the injunction seems to have
been granted solely on the ground of the threatened loss of ordinary crops. The
weight of authority seems to be contrary. Moore v. Halliday (1903) 43 Or. 243,
72 Pac. 8oi; Bridges v. Sargent (1895) I Kan. App. 442, 40 Pac. 823; Monk-
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man v. Babington (1888, Q. B.) 5 Manitoba, 253; contra: Wilson v. Eagleson
(1go3) 9 Idaho, 17, 71 Pac. 613; Bank of Edwall v. Bateman (1917) 98 Wash.
447, 167 Pac. 1io2; L. R. A. 1918 B, 413, note.
LIBEL-POWER OF A MUNICIPALITY TO SuE.-The defendant newspaper, during
a political campaign, published statements to the effect that the plaintiff city,
as a result of mal-administration, was bankrupt and could not pay its debts. To
a complaint alleging that the statements were false and actuated by malice in fact,
and had resulted in special damages of $Io,oooooo, the defendant demurred.
Held, that the demurrer should be sustained, since the defendant had an absolute
privilege to criticize the government. City of Chicago v. Tribune Co. (1923, IlL)
139 N. E. 86.
The case seems to be of first impression. All the analogies of the law of libel
are against the decision. Thus a municipality can be sued for libel. Stanley v.
Sangerville (I92O) 119 Me. 26, lO9 Atl. i89. And conditional privilege has
always been regarded as sufficient protection to the public interest in statements
regarding candidates for public office. Hubbard v. Allyn (1908) 200 Mass. 166,
86 N. E. 356; Kutcher v. Post Printing Co. (1915) 23 Wyo. 178, 147 Pac. 517;
Galveston Tribune v. Johnson (1911, Tex. Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 3o2. And see
(1923) 21 Micn. L. REv. 915. It can be argued for the decision that the absolute
privilege granted is safeguarded from abuse by the individual rights of any
officials criticized; that any criticism of an administration for extravagance,
inefficiency, or corruption must of necessity lead to some incidental damage to a
city's credit; and that any other rule will permit demagogues to shelter them-
selves behind the city and make unlimited use of the public purse in silencing
opposition. If the innovation in the law is to be approved on this basis, the
absolute privilege should at least be limited to the case of damage suffered by
a city as an incidental result only of political attacks on its administrators for
the time being.
LmL AND SLANDER-PRIvEGE-LETTER To ANTI-VICE CORPORATION BY MEM-
BE.-The defendant, a member of a moral uplift society, sent a letter to the
organization, falsely charging the plaintiff with maintaining a disorderly house and
keeping girls for immoral purposes. The purpose ;f the communication was to
cause an investigation to be started. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the
communication was not privileged. Pecue v. Collins (1923) 204 App. Div. 142,
197 N. Y. Supp. 835.
The instant decision seems indicative of a reluctance to allow private organ-
izations to usurp the functions of the public prosecutor. Cf. (0MMENTS (1922)
31 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 765; (1913) 23 ibid. 99; COMMENTS (1922) 32 ibid. 8o.
RECEIVERs-CLAIms-BREACH OF EXEcUTORY CONTRACT BY APPOINTMENT OF
REcEuvE-The plaintiff made several contracts to sell sugar to the defendant
corporation. Before the maturity of one of these contracts, the defendant corpor-
ation went into receivership and the contract was not performed. A claim for
damages was presented in receivership proceedings. Held, that the claim should
be allowed, payable out of the general assets in control of the receiver. Napier v.
People's Stores Co. (1923) 98 Conn. 414, 12b Atl. 295.
The instant case overrules the prior leading case of Wells v. Hartford Manilla
Co. (1903) 76 Conn. 27, 55 Atl. 599, and establishes for Connecticut the more
desirable rule that the appointment of a receiver for a contracting party con-
stitutes an anticipatory breach of its contracts, unless the receiver elects to per-
form. See Clark, Contingent and Immature Claims in Receivership Proceedings
(1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 481; COMMENTS (1919) 28 ibid. 673, 679; Clark,
Set-Off in Cases of Immature Claims in Insolvency and Receivership (1920) 34
HAgv. L. REv. 178.
